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Abstract
A number of internet-based digital currency platform based on decentralized public ledgers have
started since the introduction of the blockchain concept by the founder of Bitcoin in 2008. An
important element of these public ledger platforms is an incentive system that elicits efforts from a
distributed global workforce to verify and record transactions on the public ledger and a governance
system for the platform. The economic efficiency and possibly viability of a public ledger platform
ultimately depend on the design of these incentive and governance systems. Even if a decentralized
public ledger were a more efficient technology for conducting financial transactions, and for
providing a platform for distributed innovation, deficiencies in its incentive and governance systems
could make it overall inferior to alternatives, including existing systems. Current claims that public
ledger platforms can conduct financial transactions more efficiently ignore the inefficiencies
associated with the incentive and governance systems and the likely costs associated with regulation
of these platforms and complementary service providers such as vaults, wallets, and exchanges. It is
possible that public ledger platforms are more efficient than other alternative platforms for
conducing financial transactions, but as of now the proposition is based on apples-to-oranges
comparisons compounded with speculation. Competition will lead to better incentive and
governance systems for public ledger platforms.
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This paper examines the economics of internet-based digital crypto-currency platforms that
rely on a decentralized public ledger. I will refer to these platforms as “public ledger currency
platforms.” Their use of a decentralized public ledger, or blockchain, is their key distinguishing
characteristic and the fundamental innovation for this new kind of currency.1 Bitcoin was the first
decentralized pubic ledger platform, is the best known, and is the largest by several measures as of
this writing. The paper is organized as follows.
Part I describes the key attributes of public ledger currency platforms. It shows that the
typical platform consists of a protocol for sending, receiving, and recording value securely using
cryptographic methods; a container that carries value across the network; an incentive scheme for
obtaining human and machine effort for performing functions required by the protocol; an opensource software licensing model; and a governance structure. The container is usually called a “coin”
which suggests that it is money although it need not be.
Part II shows that it is improbable that a public ledger currency platform will establish its
“coin” as a general-purpose currency. By “general purpose” I mean a currency that is used widely for
exchange and not just among a niche group of users. The remainder of the paper then focuses on the
role of public ledger currency platforms in providing financial services that do not depend on the
container serving as a general-purpose currency. Most simply the container could carry generalpurpose currencies such as the euro.
Part III considers the relationships between the protocol, the human and machine effort
required by the protocol, and the incentive scheme established by the platform to elicit this effort. It
shows that the “protocol” used by public ledger currency platforms is very different conceptually and
economically from typical communication and information-technology “protocols”. It then shows
that the typical design of public ledger platforms makes it difficult for them to establish efficient
incentives schemes for eliciting effort to work for the platform and price schedules for containers
and transactions. As a result, public ledger platforms cannot operate efficiently given these common
design choices.
Part IV discusses how public ledger currency platforms are governed. It shows that a major
design choice involves determining the extent to which the platform follows an open source model
and the degree to which the governance structure varies from community-based to dictatorial. It also
considers the implication of these design choices for the efficiency of the platform. Overall, it shows
that open source models that limit the ability of the platform to set input and output prices flexibly
and in response to changes in market conditions make it difficult to operate an efficient, and perhaps
even viable, public ledger platform.
Part V makes a tentative inquiry into how the public ledger currency ecosystem could evolve.
It shows that public ledger currency platforms will tend to lead to the emergence of the same kinds
of firms, with the same kinds of regulatory and consumer protection issues, as have traditionally
existed in the financial services sector. It also shows that it is possible that the laborers for
transaction processing will evolve into large enterprises, or collectives, and that these institutions will
likely present regulatory issues as well.
Part VI examines the relationship between public ledger currency platforms and the existing
financial services sector. It identifies the data and information we would need to determine whether
decentralized public ledger currency platforms are necessarily a superior technology for delivering
financial services. It shows that it is unclear, and unproved, whether the decentralized public ledger

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  

Unless otherwise noted whenever I use public ledger platform I mean a decentralized public ledger platform.
It is possible to have a central agent verify and record transactions in a public ledger as well.
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currency platforms are more efficient and more robust than either current payment platforms or
alternatives that do not depend on an open-source public ledger model. To be clear, I am not
claiming that these platforms could not be more efficient than existing financial services providers,
only that there does not appear to be any sound basis for frequent assertions by their supporters they
are superior.
Part VII, which concludes, poses questions and issues for further consideration.
I.

Deconstructing and Defining Internet-Based Digital Currency Platforms

There are many ways to turn currency into digits and move it electronically. Most countries
have electronic systems, such as the ACH system in the US or the Giro system in Germany, for
moving money between bank accounts. Some countries have mobile money platforms, such as
mPesa in Kenya, that enable people and businesses to move money between each other using their
mobile phones without bank accounts. There are payment card systems such as MasterCard and Visa
that mainly move money electronically between people and merchants. Further there are remittance
systems such as Western Union that move money electronically in conjunction with agents that
provide cash-in and cash-out services. Wallet providers such as PayPal leverage the assets of other
payment networks to provide currency transfers between people and businesses in multiple
countries. There have also been numerous Internet-based currencies particularly those involving
games. Digital currency is therefore widespread and many decades old.
Many non-governmental currencies have appeared over time as well.2 US banks sponsored
currencies in the 19th Century. Merchants in various countries have issued their own currencies. One
study reports that more than 2000 shopkeepers in Mexico City were issuing a metal token called the
tlaco in 1766.3 Various commodities ranging from gold to airtime minutes have been used as
currency.4 Some of these, such as airtime minutes, have been used as digital currency. These nongovernmental sponsored currencies have generally not lasted as general-purpose currencies although
some solve particular problems for particular transactors in particular places for some period of time.
So what is new and different about the public ledger currency platforms?
A. Features of Decentralized Public Ledger Platforms
Bitcoin lead the way in developing a different type of digital currency platform. These new
platforms generally have the following features.
1. Internet-based
They rely on the Internet as the physical network for sending and receiving currency. That is
different from most payment platforms, such as Visa, which typically rely on private secure
communication networks.

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
2	
  Bruce

Champ, “Private Money in Our Past, Present, and Future,” Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, 2007.
http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/commentary/2007/010107.cfm	
  
3 Eric Helleiner, The Making of National Money. Territorial Currencies in Historical Perspective. Cornell University
Press, 2003.
4 Andrew Zerzan, New Technologies, New Risks? Innovation and Countering the Financing of Terrorism, The
World Bank, November, 2009.

	
  

2	
  

2. Public Ledger Protocol
They have a protocol for sending, receiving and recording value. At this stage in their
development the protocol is based on a public ledger that uses cryptographic methods to secure the
values that are sent and received and provides a public record of transactions. The operation of the
public ledger is decentralized. Individuals verify and record transactions. The valid public ledger is
roughly speaking based on a consensus among these individuals. This public ledger is sometimes
called the blockchain and is widely recognized as the key disruptive innovation.
3. Container for Value
There is container that is used to carry value on the public ledger. The container is used to
send and receive value. The container is usually called a “coin” which suggests that it is intended to
be a currency. It need not be. In principle it could contain a traditional currency such as a Yuan or a
financial derivative.
4. Incentive Scheme for Labor Force
There is an incentive scheme for eliciting effort and the contribution of resources from
people to conduct various record-keeping and verification activities for the public ledger. At this
stage in the their development, the public-ledgers for digital currencies are intensive in labor and
computer processing time. The incentive scheme provides a reward to people for providing labor,
computing power, and other resources.
5. Open Source Licensing Model
There is a licensing model for enabling people to make changes to the software for the
platform. Typically, public ledger currency platforms use one of the standard open-source licenses so
that people can use the software underlying the public ledger and make changes to it.
6. Platform Governance System
There is a governance system for determining key operating principles for the platform, for
adopting changes to the protocol and other features of the software, and for driving the evolution of
the platform. Public ledger currency platforms typically use some variant of open source governance
since they rely on a distributed network of “volunteers” to provide labor. The resulting governance
systems run the same gamut that we have observed for open source—with a for-profit company
managing the project, as is the case with Android; a benevolent dictator as is the case with Linux and
many other successful large open source projects; or a consensus-driven management as is the case
with many smaller open source projects.
B. Important Distinctions and the Danger of Analogies
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Most public ledger currency platforms have all of the preceding attributes. The combination
of these attributes makes these platforms different from traditional payment, currency, or software
platforms. As a result one needs to be very careful about equating these public ledger currency
platforms with existing platforms and using traditional concepts to describe them. Reasoning by
analogy is particularly problematic. Let me highlight several key distinctions.
Public ledger platform sponsors typically refer to the container as a coin. That name suggests
that the container is a currency. Some platform sponsors have expressed ambitions to create new
general-purpose and, indeed, globally used currencies. It is possible that the container could become
a currency if enough people wanted to use it as a medium of exchange. It is also possible that the
container could be used to carry other currencies or financial assets on the public ledger as noted
above.
In the end it is an empirical matter whether the coin becomes a general-purpose currency.
Calling the container a coin causes confusion because, at least at the start of the platform, the
container is not a currency, since it is not widely used, and because the public ledger platform could
be viable even if the container did not evolve into being a general-purpose currency.5 The next
section argues that public-ledger platforms have features that make it improbable that their
containers could evolve into general-purpose used currencies.
Another source of confusion concerns the “protocol” for public ledger platforms. Some
commentators make the analogy between the public ledger protocols and other Internet-related such
as HTTP.6 There are indeed similarities. Public ledger protocols and Internet-related protocols both
have network effects. As more people adopt each protocol the value of the protocol increases. There
are more people to transact with in the case of the public ledger platform protocols and more people
to interact with in the case of Internet communication protocols.
There is, however, a critical difference between these two types of protocols. A decentralized
public ledger protocol insists that a network of third parties stand between A and B to verify that
person A has the money to give person B and to record this transaction in the public ledger. In fact,
the public ledger protocol cannot exist as a practical matter without an incentive scheme that induces
a decentralized network of laborers to provide that effort. By contrast a typical communication
protocol does not require any intermediary between the two parties. Parties A and B can
communicate with the protocol without having to rely on any third parties. A communication
protocol does not require a network of people to facilitate the bilateral communications or an
incentive scheme to induce the effort of third parties. Establishing a decentralized public ledger
protocol is more difficult than establishing an Internet protocol because it requires the participation
of third parties and the adoption of an incentive scheme that induces the effort by enough third
parties.
Finally, one needs to be careful in comparing public ledger currency platforms with
successful open-source software models. The public ledger currency platforms may be based on an
open-source license but they are fundamentally different from typical open-source projects.7 The

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
By definition, a currency is a medium of exchange, a store of value, and a unit of account.
Marc Andreessen emphasized this to in a series of Twitter exchanges with me and others. For his views
generally, see Marc Andreessen, “Why Bitcoin Matters”. DealB%k, The New York Times. January 21, 2014.
Available at: http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/21/why-bitcoin-matters/
7 Charles M. Schweik and Robert C. English, Internet Success: A Study of Open-Source Software Commons (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 2012)
5
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pecuniary compensation of the open-source contributor is not a central design feature of open
source projects and open source projects do not in practice typically have direct compensation
schemes. Some open-source programmers work for companies that have decided to invest in an
open source project. Some entrepreneurs develop for-profit companies that provide complementary
services to the open-source project. But often programmers work for non-pecuniary reasons such as
a shared interest in solving a problem or to show off their coding skills. Open source public ledger
platforms attract programming contributions just as other open source projects do. However, the
open-source public ledger platforms require another class of participants—the laborers who perform
transaction processing—that require pecuniary compensation as an integral element of the protocol.
I mention these distinctions between public ledger platforms concepts and related concepts
not to suggest that these distinctions are good or bad. The point is that one must be very specific
about what public ledger platforms are and avoid reasoning using improper analogies.
II.

The Container as a General-Purpose Currency

Each coin has a unique digital representation. Public-ledger currency platforms adopt rules
concerning the production of coins. Typically, they create new coins, and thereby increase the supply
of coins, by granting coins as rewards to people who supply services to the platform. As a result, the
supply of coins is determined by two factors. First, it is determined by the amount of transactions
that take place on the platform. The amount of activity on the platform determines the amount of
effort required and therefore eligible for awards. Second, the supply is determined by the rules for
awarding coins in return for supplying effort to validate these transactions.
Some of the public-ledger platforms have adopted rules that result in the supply of coins
converging to a finite limit. The Bitcoin protocol, for example, sets the maximum number of coins at
21 million and has an algorithm that determines the rate of increase towards that long-run
equilibrium.8 Once that limit is reached laborers no longer receive any awards of coins for providing
services. Their compensation, if any, would then be based entirely on transaction fees. Other
platforms, such as Dogecoin, have adopted rules that allow for a steady increase in the maximum
number of coins. The finite supply and constant-increase rules public ledger platform prevent the
governance system for the platform from having any discretion over the supply of coins. Coin
supply is hardwired into the protocol.
Coins are indestructible, are useful so long as the platform is, and are therefore long-lived
assets. The value of a long-lived asset at any point in time reflects expectations about its future value.
Given expectations, intertemporal arbitrage should result in a stable value for the asset that reflects
its long-run value. Changes in expectations can change the value. If market participants expect that
changes in demand or supply will reduce the value of the asset in the future they will bid the price of
the asset down today. Likewise if market participants expect that changes in demand or supply will
increase the value of the asset in the future they will bid the price of the asset up. These principles
apply in practice to many familiar long-lived assets such as gold, diamonds, wine, and art.

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
“The block creation fee changes at every 210000 blocks. The block creation fee is a function of block height
on the chain (genesis=0), and is calculated using 64 bit integer operations (in satoshis) as: (50 * 100000000) >>
(height / 210000). The block creation fee started with 50 BTC, has fallen to 25 BTC at block 210000, will fall
to 12.5 BTC at block 420000, and finally down to 0 satoshi with block 6930000. The block creation fee of all
coinbase transactions will sum up to 2099999997690000 satoshis, practically 21million BTC.” See
https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Protocol_rules
8
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They also apply to public ledger coins. The value of a coin depends on the expectations of
market participants concerning its long-run value. Rational buyers would not pay $100 for a coin that
would be worth $50 in the future and rational sellers would not take $100 for a coin that would be
worth $200 in the future. If there were stable expectations over time the value of a coin would be
stable over time. If expectations vary then the value will vary too, with increases when there is a
change in expectation towards higher value and decreases when there is a change in expectations
towards lower values.
The expected value depends on expectations concerning demand and supply of the asset
over time. Since containers cannot be used for anything other than transactions the demand should
depend entirely on the demand for the containers for conducting transactions on the platform. That
may be difficult to predict. The supply depends on the stock of coins as well as the flow of new
coins. In the long run the supply is fixed either at a finite level or by a deterministic increase rule.
Until that long run is reached, however, the supply is correlated with transactions given the protocol
and incentive scheme adopted by the typical public ledger platform. Like any asset, however, we
would expect that market participants would engage in speculation over the future value of the asset.
We would expect that the market price of containers would be volatile in the early stages of
platforms and become less volatile over time. Over time market participants would obtain more
information about the likely demand and supply of containers as they get a better sense of the likely
adoption of the platform and the utility of the platform for transactions. A platform that is more
widely adopted by senders and receivers would have more transactions. A platform that can support
more types of transaction—for example, conditional transactions and derivatives in addition to
remittances—would also have more transactions.
Although we would expect that volatility would decline over time we would still expect the
price of the containers to fluctuate. That would occur simply because expectations over demand
could change for a myriad of reasons, some having to do with the platform, others having to do with
competing platforms, and still others having to do with economic conditions that affect the volume
of transactions that people and businesses want to engage in.
This volatility presents no particular problem for the ability of platforms to use coins as
containers. In this case the coin is simply an input used for transactions on the platform. Senders
need to buy a container—a satoshi, for example, which is the smallest unit of a bitcoin—to carry
transactions on the public ledger. 9 The cost of that may affect their interest in using the platform for
particular types of transactions. But, in the end, it is simply a cost of doing business and the input
price would presumably settle to a level at which transactions were value-increasing for senders and
receivers.
This volatility poses a much more serious barrier, however, to the adoption of the
container—the so-called “coin”—as a general-purpose currency. Senders and receivers want to know
the value of the funds they are sending or receiving. They therefore gravitate towards currencies that
are stable and avoid currencies that are unstable.10 Stable currencies also push out unstable
currencies. People and businesses in countries with unstable currencies often use other stable
currencies such as the dollar for trade. When countries go through extreme periods of currency

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
The container would probably be the smallest divisible unit of the coin. In the case of Bitcoin, the smallest
unit is a .00000001 of a bitcoin and is called a satoshi.
10 For an early discussion of the importance of a stable currency that is particularly relevant to the current
discussion over private crypto-currencies, see F. A. Hayek, Denationalisation of Money: The Argument Refined,
Institute of International Affairs, 3rd edition, 1990. Available at http://mises.org/books/denationalisation.pdf
9

	
  

6	
  

instability people and businesses tend to stop using the domestic currency almost entirely and use
alternative currencies.
The importance of stability for currencies is seen in how central banks manage their national
currencies. Most central banks manage the national money supply to achieve currency stability along
with other macroeconomic objectives. Currency stability may give way to other priorities such as
stimulating growth and reducing unemployment. Countries occasionally devalue their currencies as a
result of trade imbalances or for other macroeconomic policy reasons. Nevertheless, central banks
are judged in large part on their track record at achieving currency stability. They typically take this
task seriously because the economic and political consequences of an unstable currency are too
severe.
The importance of stability is one reason why there is virtually no support among central
banks or economists for going back to the gold standard. For many years countries tied the value of
their currency to gold by agreeing to redeem currency in gold. That resulted in periods of deflation
and inflation that destabilized economies.11 It also prevented the central bank from adjusting the
money supply to deal with recessions or to counteract destabilizing periods of inflation or deflation.
Virtually all economists, of all stripes and persuasions, oppose a return to the gold standard for these
reasons.12
The empirical evidence shows that public-ledger currencies are in fact extremely volatile at
this stage in their development. Column 2 of Table 1 shows the ratio between the intraday volatility
(measured by the standard deviation of percentage intraday variation of the currency relative to the
US dollar) of the euro and of three of the most popular public ledger currencies over the first 90 days
on 2014. Bitcoin, the most stable of the three public ledger currencies is more than 18 times more
volatile than the euro. The volatility has resulted in part from uncertainty over regulatory treatment
of these currencies as well as market uncertainty over innovative financial services platforms.
It is possible that the degree of volatility will fall, as these issues get resolved. However, the
volatility is high even during shorter periods of time in which there is little new information
concerning the regulatory changes or the long-run viability of these currencies. Column 3 Table 2
shows similar ratios for month of January 2014 that preceded much of the negative events
concerning Bitcoin. Bitcoin is still more than 15 times more volatile than the euro. Importantly, the
data show a very high degree of volatility for bitcoin, which was five years into its growth phase as of
early 2014.

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  

If the value of a currency is increasing—that is, there is deflation—currency owners have an incentive to
hold it to realize the appreciation. During the American Civil War people ceased using metal coins as currency
as their value increased. Deflation tends to slow down economies and central banks avoid it like the plague. A
little bit of inflation—in which the value of the currency declines—is arguably a good thing. Rapid inflation,
though, is a problem. Then receivers of funds can experience real costs if they cannot move the funds into an
interest-bearing account that compensates them for the decline in the value of their funds.
12 The University of Chicago did a pool of prominent economists and did not find a single support despite the
fact that the economists polled were drawn from a wide spectrum. See http://www.igmchicago.org/igmeconomic-experts-panel/poll-results?SurveyID=SV_cw1nNUYOXSAKwrq
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Table 1. Ratio of Intraday Volatility between Cyrpto-Currencies and Euro
(relative to the dollar between January and March 2014)
Cryptocurrency

January-March

January

Bitcoin / euro

18.44

15.79

Dogecoin / euro

63.90

92.40

Litecoin / euro
27.73
21.49
Source: Compilation with data from quandl.com, coinplorer.com, oanda.com
During the early years we would expect that public ledger coins would be volatile. But
eventually much of the uncertainty will become resolved and market participants will have similar
expectations on its future. One could argue that the asset value will become stable in the long run
and can then be a currency.
Unfortunately, while it is possible that the value could become more stable in the long run it
is still likely to be more volatile than the government-sponsored of most developed countries. That
is because there is no central bank to intervene to make it stable. And the market value would likely
fluctuate because of unanticipated changes in economic conditions, the development of competing
currencies, and other issues involving the platform. If fact, one of the problems with gold, which
was a physical currency with a fairly finite supply, was that its value fluctuated considerably when it
was the standard. Figure 1 shows the fluctuation of prices under the gold standard.13 Of course,
gold had several millennia in which stabilize.
It is also possible that the market could provide solutions to volatility. For example, some
bitcoin wallet providers such as Coinbase insure merchants against the volatility. Consumers buy
coins for the wallets. When they pay a merchant that accepts bitcoins the wallet provider pays the
merchant with a traditional currency. The logical extension would be to extend provide this same
benefit to the consumer so they would not bear any currency risk either. The consumer could
maintain a dollar balance in the wallet. When they want to pay a merchant the wallet provider could
purchase bitcoins from an exchange so the consumer would not have to hold any.

Figure 1

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  

See Matthew O’Brien, “Why the Gold Standard is the World’s Worst Economic Idea, in 2 Charts,” The
Atlantic, August 26, 2012, at http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/08/why-the-gold-standardis-the-worlds-worst-economic-idea-in-2-charts/261552/
13

	
  

8	
  

This solution, in fact, demonstrates that the coin is not a medium of exchange. Consider the
first case where the merchant was insured but the consumer was not. The merchant is not really
accepting the coin for payment at all. They are accepting dollars or whatever traditional currency they
have chosen to be paid in. The wallet provider is serving as an intermediary for senders who cannot
find receivers willing to take the currency.
Consider the second case where the consumer and the merchant are both insured. In that
case the transaction makes no sense. The consumer uses dollars to buy coins from the wallet
provider for a transaction, the wallet provider buys coins from an exchange, then the wallet provider
sells the coins back to the exchange since it needs to pay the merchant in dollars, then wallet provider
pays the merchant in dollars, and the consumer gets their purchase. Of course the wallet provider
could dispense with coins entirely and simply take dollars from the consumer and pay the merchant.
In the real world, of course, people could also use unstable currencies to transact in and
hedge their transactions with various foreign exchange products. But unless they have some legal or
regulatory obligation to do this they would simply standardize their transactions using a stable
currency.
If in fact public ledger currencies were gaining widespread use one would have to dismiss
these concerns over their stability. One could not argue with success. Although there is currently a
great deal of press concerning bitcoin becoming widely used for commerce, the empirical evidence is
less clear. We know from other platform businesses that successful platforms typically have
“hockey-stick” growth path. There is slow growth until the platform reaches critical mass at which
point growth accelerates rapidly. There is an inflection point at once critical mass is reached. Figure 2
shows the growth of bitcoin “transactions.”
This chart overstates the use of bitcoins as a medium of exchange because these transactions
include situations in which bitcoins are being bought and sold for speculative reasons. Even so, five
years after the inception of the platform the chart does not show any evidence that bitcoin has the
sort of hockey-stick growth that would be consistent with it being adopted as a form of payment.
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The apparent failure of Bitcoin to achieve accelerating growth is also seen by considering
the growth of another person-to-person payment mechanism—mPesa—which was started around
the same time as bitcoin. Figure 3 shows the growth of transactions for bitcoin and mPesa over their
lifecycles. MPesa shows the typical hockey-stick growth, reaching an inflection point roughly 1 year
after start, while bitcoin does not.

Figure 2
Number of Bitcoin Transaction
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Source: Compilation with data from quandl.com

Figure 3
Comparison of Bitcoin and mPesa Transactions
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My conclusion is that it is highly improbable that public ledger coins, given the current
protocols and governance systems, will evolve into general-purpose currencies. That is based on
several findings. First, the protocols for supplying public ledger coins do not adjust supply with
demand and therefore cannot provide stable values for the coins. Second, the theoretical
explanations concerning why public ledger coins have unstable value are borne out by the empirical
evidence concerning the volatility of bitcoin. Third, senders and receivers of funds will generally not
adopt putative currencies that have unstable values. Moreover, senders will tend to hold rather than
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use putative currencies if the currencies are increasing in value. Fourth, the importance of currency
stability is borne out by the fact that central banks focus on maintaining currency stability and the
fact that senders and receivers avoid unstable currencies. Fifth, five years after its inception there is
no empirical evidence that would support claims that bitcoin is becoming a general-purpose
currency; rather appears to be a niche currency and one that involves many transactions between
speculators.
Public ledger currency platforms could nevertheless provide a more efficient alternative to
existing payment and other financial services platforms. The “container”, or coin, can carry
traditional currencies and financial assets on the platform. In this case, the value of the container is
not as a general-purpose currency but rather as an elementary input for the platform that facilitates
the movement of financial assets on the public ledger. That container has an asset value and could be
bought and sold in a market. Like any asset its value could be volatile and that would not necessarily
interfere with the value of the container as an input into a financial services platform using the public
ledger.
III.

Protocols, Incentive Schemes, and Eliciting Effort to Operate the Public Ledger

The public ledger—or blockchain— is the fundamental innovation. It was first described in
the white paper that proposed the Bitcoin peer-to-peer electronic cash system.14 The public ledger
requires protocols, effort required to implement the protocols, and the incentive system for eliciting
that effort. This section focuses on the relationship between these components of the public ledger
platform. The reader can consult many other sources for technical details.
The protocol provides a set of rules for using cryptographic techniques for sending and
receiving transactions and using a distributed network to record and validate transactions. The
process of recording and validating transactions on the public ledger requires effort by software
programmers using computers. Protocols have different rules for confirming transactions. In the case
of Bitcoin, transactions that take place at a given time are aggregated into a block, laborers
independently solve algorithms to assess the validity of transactions in the block, and they broadcast
valid blocks to all other laborers. Laborers determine whether a posted block is valid and, if it is,
work on the subsequent block. The longest chain is taken as the valid version for the public ledger.
The laborers are called “miners” in the case of Bitcoin because they make new bitcoins as a reward
for their work. Different public ledger platforms may have different protocols for recording and
validating transactions. But they all require laborers. (I argue later that the laborers would likely end
up being mainly organized into enterprises.)
The laborers invest their own time, the cost of computer equipment, electricity, and
perhaps other resources to perform these functions. This situation is very different from most open
source projects. Programmers on open source projects often write software code that benefits
themselves, or their employers, directly. They typically do not incur significant out-of-pocket costs.
The public ledger laborers, however, spend significant effort. They also incur significant
costs in particular for computational resources. They are not contributing to a software project that
will benefit themselves or their employers. Instead, they are providing a service services to individuals
and businesses that are engaging in financial transactions.
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There is no reason laborers would provide these critical services for free or to the extent
needed for the platform. Recognizing this, public ledger currency platforms have implemented
“incentive schemes” that are designed to elicit the supply of labor and other necessary resources.
The Bitcoin white paper proposed to do this by giving bitcoins to laborers as rewards for their
services in addition to possible bitcoin-based transaction fees.
This incentive system served a dual purpose. It injected new bitcoins into the system as it
grew in addition to providing compensation for the effort expended. For Bitcoin the laborers are
called “miners” because a byproduct of their efforts, during the growth phase, is the creation of new
currency, just like people searching for gold. Most other public ledger currency platforms have
adopted a similar approach. (Ripple, on the other hand, created a finite supply of containers and is
awarding them like stock grants to motivate behavior.)
The relationship between the protocols, the incentive system and the supply of effort has
not attracted much discussion. It is clearly central to the performance of the public ledger. The public
ledger depends on the supply of labor and resources to function. The supply of labor depends on the
incentives the platform provides to laborers. The incentives depend on the value of the coins
provided as rewards as well as any transaction fees.
In the remainder of this section I examine the ability of the incentive system to elicit labor to
manage the public ledger. It is useful to begin by considering how different types of public-ledger
platforms would operate under centralized control.
Consider the situation in which a not-for profit entity (NPE) operates a public ledger in the
public interest. Aside from using the blockchain technology the NPE in this example can do
anything it wants. We will therefore call it an unconstrained NPE (UNPE). There’s no obvious
reason why it would choose to set a fixed supply of containers for the public ledger. Instead, it would
determine the socially optimal number of containers for the public and set the socially optimal price
to ration these containers across senders. It would also set socially optimal transaction fees taking
into account the cost of resources needed to process these transactions on the public ledger. It would
hire workers and other resources to operate the platform. Like any business it would vary its prices
and wages over time in response to changes in demand and other market conditions.
The UNPE would also vary transaction fees and labor payments across countries. The
demand for sending and receiving financial transactions varies across countries. For remittances
people are willing to pay more for transferring money between the UK and Poland than between
Chad and Nigeria. With a globally distributed workforce, the not-for profit entity would also pay
different fees in different countries to minimize costs. There is no need to pay someone in Bolivia as
much as someone in Norway.
Now let’s assume that the NPE is required contractually to follow the typical public ledger
protocol and incentive system. We will call this the constrained NPE (CNPE).
The CNPE would have to release coins following a mechanistic rule (possibly up to a finite
limit) rather than varying the supply based on the demand for containers. As a result it would lose
any control over the price of containers. The market would determine the price of coins.
Then, during the growth period, the CNPE would follow the protocol in awarding laborers
with durable containers (coins) in return for their efforts in processing transactions on the public
ledger in addition to transaction fees. However, since the CNPE does not have any control over the
price of the coins it has no control over the value of the awards. This incentive system is similar to a
company hiring workers on a piece rate but where the value of the piece rate is variable and outside
of the control of the employer. It would be like a blueberry farmer saying you will be paid 𝑋 per
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bushel you pick but where the blueberry farmer has no control over the value of 𝑋 and where the
worker therefore does not know the value of the piece rate. The piece rate would also have to be the
same worldwide. Moreover, as we saw above the price of the containers at any point in time reflects
long-run expectations concerning the demand for transactions on the platform. The price of the
containers at any point in time therefore does not even reflect current demand for using the
platform. To take our blueberry example, the piece rate for picking blueberries does not necessarily
even correspond to the current market demand for blueberries.
The transaction fee is the other possible lever for motivating the laborers. Whether the
platform can set or adjust the transaction fee depends on the protocol the platform has adopted and
the governance system. Bitcoin, for example, provides for voluntary transaction fees; the idea is that
if senders offer a transaction fee, and a higher one, their transactions will receive a higher priority by
the miners. Presumably a consensus would emerge. This mechanism for providing incentives is
novel and there is no apparent reason why it would enable the revelation of efficient prices for
laborers. Also, it is unclear whether the governance system for Bitcoin would enable the platform to
establish mandatory transaction fees or to vary these fees based on the demand for effort.
The CNPE could not manage the public ledger platform efficiently under these constraints.
It needs to manage a globally distributed workforce and the provision of resources to the platform.
It also needs to decide on the optimal release of containers into the system. But it has few tools for
performing either of these tasks. This would therefore appear to be a rather rickety structure for
operating any sort of substantial remittance network or other financial services platform.
In fact, the approach towards managing the standard public ledger platform is so novel that
we do not have any comparisons for assessing whether this approach could support an efficient or
even viable platform in the long run. The public ledger platform model deviates significantly from
open source models because the public ledger has to hire significant resources. Indeed, I do not
know of any open source projects that manage markets that supply outputs and hire inputs in this
manner. The public ledger platform also differs from proprietary models involving for-profit and
not-for profit businesses because the platform protocol cedes almost all control over output and
input prices to mechanistic rules that cannot adjust to market circumstances.
Bitcoin has operated for five years now and could provide some insights into how these
platforms could operate in practice. It is, unfortunately, difficult to infer much about the long-run
operation of public ledger platforms from the Bitcoin experience. There has been a rapid increase in
the supply of resources to the Bitcoin platform in the last year. A whole industry of miners has
developed. Manufacturers are producing increasingly powerful and expensive mining equipment.
This rapid increase in the supply of effort is, however, a predictable consequence of the
rapid increase in the price of bitcoins that are provided as rewards to miners. The price increased
from an average of $130.85 in April 2013 to $594.32 in March 2014. During that time the price was
as low as $67.86 and as high as $1151.0015. This tremendous price fluctuation is obviously not the
result of changes in the demand and supply of containers for transactions. Figure 4 shows the
average monthly price of bitcoins and the average monthly number of transactions; as noted above
the number of monthly transactions are likely dominated by exchanges between speculators who are
holding bitcoin rather than using them for traditional transactions. The price fluctuation has been
driven mainly by changes in beliefs concerning the expected future value of the containers as I
argued above. While this process is eliciting more than enough effort to manage transactions at this
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point it does not tell us anything about how the platform would work in the longer run when the
awards are less important, as they will be given the design of the protocol, and the novelty of mining
has worn off.

Average Number of Daily Transactions

Jan-14

Oct-13

Jul-13

Apr-13

Jan-13

Oct-12

Jul-12

Apr-12

Jan-12

Oct-11

Jul-11

Apr-11

Jan-11

Oct-10

Jul-10

Apr-10

Jan-10

Oct-09

Jul-09

Apr-09

Jan-09

80000
70000
60000
50000
40000
30000
20000
10000
0

Figure 4
Bitcoin Daily Price and Transactions

900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0

Average Bitcoin Price

Source: Compilation with data from quandl.com
My conclusion is that the incentive system is central to the performance of any public ledger
platform but that, as typically designed and given how the typical platform is governed, the incentive
system does not enable the platform to manage the supply of effort to the platform efficiently.
Further work is needed to model the interrelated market for containers, market for transactions, and
market for effort.
Several other conclusions follow from the discussion above and will help motivate the
remaining sections of the paper.
First, proponents of public ledger platforms often claim that they provide a peer-to-peer
system for transferring financial assets that eliminates the need for intermediaries. That isn’t quite
right. The platform is the intermediary and uses an incentive scheme to hire resources to perform the
functions of the intermediary. The fact that the intermediary may choose to use a globally distributed
workforce is not a relevant detail. After all, remittance networks also use globally distributed thirdparty agents to perform many of the tasks of the network. The fact that the public ledger is
decentralized—so there is not a bank or a government acting as the intermediary—may have
interesting political or social value to some. But from the standpoint of considering economic
efficiency there is still an intermediary, just a very different sort of one.
Second, nothing in the organization of public ledger platforms necessarily guarantees that
these new intermediaries are more efficient at conducting financial services transactions than other
alternative intermediaries. While the blockchain may provide an efficient technology for processing
transactions, the limited control of the platform over input and output prices would likely result in it
operating less efficiently than an entity that has control over input and output prices. It is ultimately
an empirical question whether the public ledger platform is more efficient than other alternatives
including existing platforms or new ones that do not rely on the public ledger.
Third, the evolution of public ledger platforms depends critically on the design of the
governance system. In our discussion above we assumed that the platform was run by a non-profit
entity interested in maximizing the social value of the platform. But the objectives of the governance
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system depend on how it is designed. It could operate to maximize the value of the platform for
transactions purposes or the value to miners or to some other interest group. The ability of the
platform governance to achieve whatever objectives it has depends on the degree of control it has
over prices. I turn to this next.

IV.

Public Ledger Governance

In principle, a for-profit entity could operate a public ledger platform. It would use the
blockchain technology, sell containers, and hire resources to operate the ledger. It would also own its
intellectual property including software code and trademarks. As with the UNPE discussed above the
for-profit entity could decide to rely on decentralized markets for some of its activities such as selling
the containers or hiring resources. So far, however, public ledger platforms have mainly adopted
some version of an open source model and it is this organizational form that I focus on.
A typical open source project solicits volunteers to help develop software code. The
founders of the project usually develop some basic code to help solve a problem. They then solicit
volunteers to help work on it. The software is released under an open-source license that enables
people to use the open-source project code for free and to redistribute the code for free under the
same license. Some licenses have a “copyleft” feature that requires anyone who redistributes the
software code to make available any improvements they have made to the software under the same
license. There is usually a lead developer and a core development team. This team and their
designates incorporate proposed additions and changes made by participating developers into the
core software although the rules for doing so varies according to the governance structure for the
project.
Although open source projects share these features there is great heterogeneity in how
projects operate in practice. In many case the open source project consists of a handful of
developers who are in communication with each other and make decisions by consensus. In some
cases there is a for-profit company, such as Google in the case of Android, behind the project. That
company will typically fund the core development team. In other cases there is a very strong leader,
such Linus Torvalds in the case of Linux, who maintains tight control over the project. Schweik and
English have found, in fact, that large successful open source projects typically have a benevolent
dictator who makes decisions.16
As is well known, one of the major problems for open source is that many different versions
of the software evolve leading to forking and fragmentation of the code. That can happen even with
more hierarchical models. For example, there are many different versions of Android and one of the
major drawbacks of this software is that application developers would have to make modifications,
perhaps significant, to their software to run on all these different versions.
To illustrate the possible governance models for public ledger platforms we consider three
examples.
Bitcoin has adopted a loose governance model. There is a core developer group. There is
also a foundation that provides financial support for core development. The core developer group
solicits volunteers to contribute to development of the source code. The core developer group,
mainly operating through the foundation, also encourages people to maintain servers to host a
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distributed version of the public ledger and to engage in processing transactions. Anyone could
modify details of the software code. Developers who propose changes to the software can let the
development team know. If it is a simple noncontroversial change then they will adopt it. If not, the
developer is supposed to post the change and it will be adopted if there is a broad consensus in the
community that it should be.
As with most open source projects, it is possible that alternative versions of bitcoin could
arise. In fact they have. Litecoin is a significant fork of bitcoin. It has a similar loose governance
structure. Dogecoin, which has become the third most frequently used public ledger currency, is
built off of the Litecoin code base. It also has a foundation and a core development team behind it
similar to Bitcoin. One of the changes these public ledger platforms have made to the bitcoin
software code concerns the generation of coins and the resulting incentive scheme for the laborers.
However, they have continued to adopt largely mechanistic schemes for supplying coins and
compensating laborers.
Ripple has taken a different approach. The public ledger platform software was developed
by a for-profit company, which has secured private investment. It made the software open source,
which enables it to benefit from open source development by volunteers but also makes the software
available freely to everyone who has opens up the possibility of forking and fragmentation. Ripple,
unlike Bitcoin, has given effectively stock grants on the containers which are called ripples. It uses
these stock grants to motivate members of the community and to compensate the company. Ripple
has a hierarchical governance model similar to Google’s governance model over Android.
All of these platforms, however, also need to govern the laborers and other resources that
operate the peer-to-peer network and public ledger. They need to motivate them and they may need
to regulate them as we discuss in the next section. How they do that within a loose governance
structure that has further given up key tools for guiding the platform is hard to envision.
My conclusion is that it is unclear whether the public ledger currency platforms will adopt
governance systems that would enable them operate efficient, or even viable, financial services
businesses. The few large open source software projects that have succeeded do not provide any
evidence that the public ledger platforms will succeed too. As we saw above, the public ledger
platforms are much more complicated than typical open project projects because they involve
managing, and incenting, a potentially very large network of “laborers” to provide processing and of
individuals to maintain servers for hosting the distributed public ledger platform. To my knowledge
no one has tried using an open source governance framework to manage such a large and
complicated economic enterprise.
The existing public ledger platforms could adopt more flexible and centralized governance
systems. But attempting to do so could run into opposition from the community that supports these
platforms including the laborers. New public ledger platforms could also arise that could rely at the
outset on flexible and centralized governance systems. Whether they could secure the same amount
of interest on the part of laborers and users is not clear. For example, Ripple has a more flexible and
centralized governance structure than Bitcoin. But at least at this point there is no evidence that it is
securing significant interest on the part of a global community of users and laborers; as expected, in
fact, it is being criticized for deviating from the decentralized model of other open-source based
public ledger platforms.
V.
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The public ledger platforms will likely reside at the center of an ecosystem in which two
kinds of firms will develop. The first kind of firms would provide financial services to consumers and
businesses based on the public ledger platform. I call this the “public ledger financial services
market”. The second kind of firms would operate the platform itself by providing processing and
other services. I call this the “public ledger processing market.”
Let me begin with the financial services market. The public ledger currency platforms would
attract developers of applications that would use the platform to provide financial services. We would
expect that there would be market opportunities for the same kinds of businesses that currently exist
in financial services. That is what we have seen so far with Bitcoin. Companies have emerged that
provide depository services (that is, places where people can securely keep their bitcoins), exchanges
for buying and selling bitcoins, intermediaries that facilitate transactions between consumers and
merchants, and cash-in/cash-out centers (these are currently unintended “ATM” type devices). We
would also expect to see new forms of financial services firms emerge that rely on the fact that the
containers can carry software code. A number of commentators have speculated that the containers
would facilitate rules-based transactions.
We would expect that these businesses would raise the same prudential regulation and
consumer protection issues as traditional financial services businesses. As these businesses mature,
depository services will end up facing banking regulation, exchanges securities regulation, payment
businesses consumer protection regulations, and all these businesses money transfer regulations.
There is no apparent reason why public ledger platforms would lead to fewer regulatory or
consumer-protection issues, or require fewer compliance resources, than non-public ledger based
financial services firms.
A related point concerns the geographic reach of the firms that facilitate the provision of
financial services. Financial services regulation is national (with a Brussels-driven overlay in the
European Union). That tends to limit the geographic reach of financial services players in part
because there are diseconomies in serving multiple geographies and in part because some countries
impose barriers to entry. In fact, differences in national regulatory practices, which lead to
differences in financial services practices, are the source of many of the inefficiencies in conducting
cross-border payments transactions.
We are already seeing many of these regulatory developments with Bitcoin. Countries are
looking into the regulation of various aspects of bitcoin transactions. That includes imposing money
transfer regulations (KYC and AML regulations), regulations on the relationship between bitcoin
exchanges and depository institutions, and exchange regulations. In some cases these regulations
have made it impossible to operate—for example regulations by the People’s Bank of China may
effectively prevent bitcoin exchanges from operating in China.17 In other cases these regulations have
simply extended existing regulations to bitcoins—for example money transfer regulations in the
United States.
Let me now turn to the public ledger processing market. Previously we referred to the
participants in this market as “laborers.” The public ledger platforms typically use open source
terminology to refer to these laborers in the same way they refer to coders who participate in open
source projects. The platform rules do not require that individuals rather than firms provide the
processing services. It is difficult to predict the evolution of the processing market given the
uncertainty over the incentives schemes. If public ledger platforms could establish predictable prices

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  

Xhang Yuzho and Li Xiaoxio, “PBOC Rule Means Bitcoin Websites in China Must Close, Expert Says,”
Caixin Online, March 27, 2014. http://english.caixin.com/2014-03-27/100657518.html .
17

	
  

17	
  

for the services from processing there would be incentives for the emergence of large firms.
Processing is intensive in computational capacity. With predictable prices entrepreneurs would make
capital investments in computer capacity and realize scale economies, as is currently the case with
payments processing generally. With unpredictable, or suboptimal, prices there would be less
incentive to make sunk cost investments in forming firms and buying computer capacity. In that case
we would expect processing to be conducted by underemployed laborers. During the growth period,
however, the prices for processing are tied to the price for the containers. That could provide an
incentive for enterprises, or other coalitions, to form for the purpose of manipulating the currency
prices.
The Bitcoin experience provides some insights into the evolution of the processing market.
Bitcoin transactions were initially processed by individuals using personal computers. As the price of
bitcoins increased, and the computational difficulty of processing increased, two things major
developments occurred. First, an equipment market emerged to provide more powerful
computational capacity to miners. Second, mining pools emerged to diversify the risks of engaging in
mining in which new bitcoins were awarded randomly. Reportedly, at one point one of the mining
pools controlled more than 50 percent of the mining capacity.18 That potentially gave the pool the
ability to manipulate bitcoin prices as well as to engage in other bad behavior. The Bitcoin
community discouraged the operation of such a large pool but it does not appear, other than moral
suasion, it has any ability to prevent it.
The public ledger platform processing market would seem ripe for some forms of regulation.
There are opportunities for laborers to cause negative externalities for the platform as the mining
pool illustrates. That regulation could come either from the platform itself if its governance system
were capable of that. Alternatively, as with the financial services side of the platform, it could come
from the government.
VI.

Comparison of Public Ledger Currency Platforms with Existing Financial
Services Platforms

This section considers whether public ledger currency platforms could provide financial
services products more efficiently, or lead to more rapid innovation, than alternative platforms that
do not rely on a public ledger. It does not provide an answer but describes factors one would need to
consider and data one would need to make such an assessment.
It is important to take several things into account in comparing public ledger and traditional
platforms.
First, as always it is essential to compare like with like. Public ledger platforms are networks
that enable the transfer of financial assets from a sender to a receiver. They should therefore be
compared to financial services assets that provide the same functions. It may be that public ledger
platforms could make it cheaper to provide ancillary functions but if so we need to say what those
functions are and establish why public ledger platforms are better.
Consider remittances for example. One can compare the movement of public ledger
currencies from the wallet providers for sender A to receiver B to the movement of traditional
currencies from that traditional wallet (e.g. PayPal) of A to B after accounting for possible differences
in services such as fraud protection. One cannot compare the movement of public ledger currents
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from the wallet providers for A and B to the movement of cash from a traditional remittance
network that operates cash-in/cash-out agents in locations convenient to A and B.
For the purposes of operating a P2P money transfer network it is not obvious that the
public ledger platforms are more efficient than traditional platforms. Traditional platforms such as
Visa, ACH/Giro systems, PayPal, and similar national and global digital money systems are extremely
efficient at transferring funds. They operate large, global, computerized networks with built-in
redundancy. The actual cost of transferring funds from A to B is trivial. The prices that individuals
and merchants pay are largely the result of other services that these platforms provide including
security and fraud protection.
A number of countries have ACH-type systems that enable individuals to transfer money
essentially for free given that they have a bank account. In the last few years, significant innovations
have occurred to lower the cost and increase the convenience of these transfers. For example, Paym
in the UK is enabling consumers to use their mobile phones to do P2P transfer just using mobile
phone numbers; clearXchange in the US enables customers of participating banks to conveniently
transfer funds; and mobile money schemes in a number of countries enable P2P money transfer on
mobile devices.
There are of course many examples of frictions that result in inefficiencies in transferring
money globally. But these frictions largely result from different national regulations of financial
services together with the demand by governments, and the public, for strong laws concerning
money laundering and terrorism.
PayPal provides a useful comparison for the public ledger platforms. It does not charge
senders or receivers anything for transferring funds between accounts in the case in which both
sender and receiver have PayPal accounts. For overseas transfers it charges the sender between 0.5
percent and 2 percent depending on the country for transactions that are fully funded from a bank
account.
It is possible that public ledger platforms could provide these services more efficiently over a
decentralized network using an incentive scheme to attract laborers. But that proposition is not
obviously true and would need to be established. Any estimates of the relative efficiency of the public
ledger platforms would need to address the operation of incentive and governance systems for these
platforms, as these affect the cost and efficiency of these platforms. They would also need to address
the cost of any regulations. There are other factors that would need to be considered as well,
including the security of a networks under and not under central control given the assumption that
both can benefit from advances in cryptographic technologies.
Unfortunately, discussions concerning the relative efficiency of public ledger platforms have
been extremely superficial. They typically involve someone claiming that it costs significantly money
to send funds using Western Union and costs little to send bitcoins. That is an apples and oranges
comparison. The typical Western Union sending customer is going to an agent in a poor part of a
city, where it is costly for agents to operate, going through KYC checks, and handing in cash. The
typical Western Union receiving customer is going to an agent in a remote part of a country and
going through KYC checks there as well. Western Union is operating a network of physical agents
for cash in and cash out. The cost of the computerized network for transferring money from the
receiving agent to the sending agent is trivial. The cost lies in the agent network and the regulations.
It is true that bitcoins are more efficient for an upper middle class entrepreneur in the US to send
bitcoins to his middle class developer in Belarus who can then use the bitcoins to buy some things
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online. That use case, though, is not particularly relevant to most of the billions of people on the
planet.
Second, the financial services products supported by public ledger platforms are almost
certainly going to be subject to the same sorts of regulations as other financial services products.
There is nothing about public ledger platforms that makes the governmental and public demand for
regulation and consumer protection lower for financial services businesses based on the public ledger
rather than traditional platforms.
The depository institutions and exchanges for public ledger platforms are already
encountering many of the same issues that lead to regulation for similar institutions for traditional
financial services products. And we are already hearing demands—including from the supporters of
public ledger platforms—for government regulation. One needs to factor in the costs of complying
with these regulations including operational and market inefficiencies that such regulations result in.
As a starting point I would expect that the regulatory costs for public ledger currency
platforms will be as high as for platforms that are not based on public ledgers. There may be a variety
of ways of evading strict bank regulations that would reduce costs. But that could be accomplished
with other platforms that are not operated by banks (such as PayPal) and would not seem to require
the blockchain.
Third, one has to make conjectures on how the incentive schemes and governance structures
for public ledger platforms will evolve before making any comparisons between the efficiency of
public ledger platforms and alternatives. Those schemes and structures, as we have seen above, have
critical implications for whether the efficiency and viability of public ledger platforms. It is not at all
obvious how most of the public ledger currency platforms could manage a large public ledger
platform requiring significant resources from laborers and other actors especially when the platforms
limit the ability of the platforms to control input and output prices. And as I mentioned earlier these
public ledger platforms are very different from large successful open source projects such as Android
and Linux since those open source projects do not require the incentive schemes for the provision of
significant amounts of labor and resources to running the platform.
We are unfortunately wading into a sea of uncertainty when it comes to how the incentive
schemes and governance structures will evolve, and their implications for the operational and
economic efficiency of these public ledger platforms. We simply do not know at this point. It is
certainly adventurous to embrace mechanistic rules and open source governance structures in the
place of using the price mechanism and for-profit enterprises for what aspires to be a large complex
industry.
This discussion has, however, ignored the possibility that the public ledger platforms could
enable new financial services products that rely on the ability to write applications for the platform
generally and the containers in particular.
Developers write applications that work with the open public ledger platform. It is possible
that as we have seen with mobile phones it will be possible to accelerate financial services innovation
by pushing innovation out to the edge into the hands of a distributed network of entrepreneurdevelopers. In addition, it is possible to use the public ledger platform for transactions that are based
on software-enabled contracts. It is possible for the container to carry software code that includes
rules concerning the transaction. Many supporters of the public ledger platforms see many
opportunities in developing innovations that rely on the ability to program the containers.
In principle, one could do this with any open platform and a number of Internet-based
financial services platforms including PayPal have created APIs and are encouraging a developer
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community. However, most financial services platforms tend to be closed for security reasons and
there has not been great enthusiasm generally for developing open platforms. Nevertheless, it is just
as possible to encourage application development on a centralized proprietary platform such as the
iPhone as on a decentralized open source platform such as Android. Indeed, Android is typically a
second choice for developers because of the cost of developing applications for multiple
incompatible versions of Android (as well as many different hardware configurations).
VII.

Open Questions and Issues

Public ledger currency platforms are complex organizations. We have much to learn about
how they will evolve over time. This paper has just made some preliminary observations that will
hopefully kick off a discussion. The following questions and issues require further consideration.
• What is the optimal governance structure for these platforms and is it possible for
them to adopt this governance structure given their origin as loosely governed open
source projects?
• How can these platforms provide efficient incentives for demanders of transactions
and suppliers of platform services given that they have adopted protocols that limit
their ability to establish prices to either demanders or suppliers?
• Can these platforms develop governance structures and incentive schemes that
would enable them to offer stable currencies by mimicking the limited discretion
approaches that many successful and sophisticated central banks adopt?
• How much more efficient are public ledger currency platforms than proprietary
closed financial services platforms in providing similar services?
• Once one accounts for operational and economic inefficiencies resulting from the
governance systems used by public ledger currency platforms, and the imposition of
regulation on financial service providers that rely on the public ledger currency
platforms, are the public ledger currency platforms more efficient than proprietary
closed financial services platforms?
• Does the ability to write applications (including rules-based transactions) for the
open public ledger software platform more than compensate for any deficiencies
these platforms have in other dimensions?
• Is it possible to achieve the benefits of distributed application development from
proprietary centralized but open platforms without incurring the costs and
inefficiencies that may result from relying on the decentralized public ledger model?
Analyzing these questions requires careful analysis and evidence. None have immediate and
unambiguous answers. That said it is not at all obvious that public ledger currency platforms provide
efficient or viable vehicles for developing financial services products.
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